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ISSUE
Is the government's right to issue a
license a "property right" under 18
.S.C. § 1341 (the federal mail
fraud statute)?
FACTS
In July 1991, the Louisiana
Legislature enacted a law allowing
the operation of video poker
machines at certain business estab-
lishments, including truck stops.
Fred Goodson had been in the truck
stop business in Slidell, La., for 20
years. In February 1992, with the
help of petitioner Carl Cleveland
(an attorney), Fred Goodson's fami-
ly formed a limited partnership,
Truck Stop Gaming, Ltd., which
would operate video poker
machines at the Slidell truck stop
and other truck stops. As he had
done with two other family busi-
nesses, Fred Goodson made his
adult children, Alex and Maria
Goodson, the owners of Truck Stop
Gaming, while he retained control
over its operations. Alex and Maria
were the limited partners of Truck
Stop Gaming, and the corporate
general partner was a corporation of
which Maria and Alex were the sole
shareholders. In 1992 Maria was 23
years old and a student at Tulane
University. Alex was 28 years old
and managed a Hardee's fast-food
restaurant owned and operated by
the Goodsons as a family business.
After Maria and Alex signed the
partnership agreement creating
Truck Stop Gaming, the agreement
was filed with the Secretary of State
as required by Louisiana law.
The start-up capital that Alex and
Maria Goodson invested in the new
partnership was provided to them in
two loans totaling $245,000. One
loan was from Fred Goodson and
Alex Goodson, and the other was
from petitioner's law firm to Maria
Goodson. When the law firm made
its loan to Maria Goodson, petition-
er and Fred Goodson discussed the
possibility that at some point the
loan, accrued interest, and any
accrued legal fees might be convert-
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ed to an ownership interest in Truck
Stop Gaming.
The Louisiana video poker statute
required prospective owners of
video poker devices to obtain licens-
es from the Louisiana State Police.
A prospective device owner was
required to complete a license appli-
cation and await the approval of the
State Police. All licenses expired on
June 30 of each year and had to be
renewed to remain valid. Licenses
were not transferable. Each device
owner was required to pay the state
$2,000 per year and 22.5 percent of
the net revenue generated by the
owner's video poker machines.
In February 1992, Truck Stop
Gaming applied for its initial device-
owner license. The application iden-
tified Alex Goodson, Maria Goodson,
and the corporate general partner as
the owners of Truck Stop Gaming.
The applications fully disclosed that
all the start-up capital for the part-
nership had been provided in loans
from Fred Goodson and petitioner's
law firm to Alex and Maria Goodson.
Alex and Maria Goodson signed the
state's form affidavits attesting that
they had no agreements or under-
standings with any other person to
hold their interests as agents, nomi-
nees, or otherwise.
In May 1992, the State Police
approved Truck Stop Gaming's
application and issued its initial
license. Truck Stop Gaming submit-
ted renewal applications in 1993,
1994, and 1995, and its license was
renewed each time. Truck Stop
Gaming owned and operated video
poker machines from 1993 through
1995 and paid the state of
Louisiana, as required by law, 22.5
percent of the net revenue generat-
ed by the machines.
In 1996, the federal government
made these applications the linch-
pin of a multicount indictment
against petitioner and others. In
four counts of mail fraud, the indict-
ment charged that petitioner, Fred
Goodson, and Maria Goodson had
executed a scheme to deprive the
State of Louisiana and its citizens of
property" by fraudulently obtaining
and renewing, through the submis-
sion of false and incomplete infor-
mation, state licenses to operate
video poker sites. The license appli-
cations allegedly failed to disclose
"understandings and agreements
with unreported parties" and "other
factors that could impact the ability
of the true owners to obtain licens-
es." The mailings underlying the
four mail fraud counts were the
mailings to the State Police of Truck
Stop Gaming's initial license in 1992
and its renewals for 1993, 1994, and
1995.
The mail fraud charges were also
the springboard for adding other
charges that carried longer potential
sentences. The indictment charged
petitioner with five counts of money
laundering based on transactions
involving proceeds of the alleged
mail fraud. The alleged mail fraud
and money laundering, in turn,
were identified as predicate acts of
racketeering to support RICO and
RICO conspiracy counts. In all, 11
of the 15 counts against petitioner
were based in whole or in part on
the mail fraud statute.
On Nov. 15, 1996, Fred Goodson
moved to dismiss the mail fraud
counts and the corresponding
alleged predicate acts of racketeer-
ing on the ground that an unissued
state license does not constitute
"property" under the mail fraud
statute. Petitioner Cleveland adopt-
ed the motion. On Jan. 14, 1997,
the District Court denied the
motion, stating that licenses consti-
tute "property" even before they are
issued. U.S. v. Cleveland, 951 F.
Supp. 1249 (E.D. La. 1999).
At trial, the government advanced
four theories in support of its con-
tention that the license applications
were false: (1) Cleveland and Fred
Goodson (not Maria and Alex
Goodson) owned Truck Stop
Gaming, (2) Maria and Alex
Goodson had pledged their owner-
ship interests to Cleveland and Fred
Goodson, (3) Cleveland and Fred
Goodson held options to acquire
Truck Stop Gaming from Maria and
Alex Goodson, and (4) Maria and
Alex Goodson were parties to agree-
ments or understandings to transfer
their ownership interests to
Cleveland and Fred Goodson in the
future. The government asserted
that Alex and Maria Goodson were
identified on the license applica-
tions as owners of Truck Stop
Gaming so that the State Police
would not conduct suitability inves-
tigations of Fred Goodson and
Cleveland, who purportedly feared
they would be found financially
unsuitable.
The jury deliberated for seven days.
All defendants were acquitted on
the illegal gambling count and two
mail fraud counts (based on the
license issued in 1992 and the 1993
renewal). Petitioner was found
guilty, however, on the other two
mail fraud counts (based on the
renewal licenses issued in 1994 and
1995), four money laundering
counts, and the RICO and RICO
conspiracy counts. The convictions
for money laundering, RICO, and
RICO conspiracy all depended on
the allegations of mail fraud.
Applying the sentencing guidelines
for money laundering, the district
court sentenced petitioner, who
until this case had never been
charged with a crime, to 10 years
and one month in prison.
On appeal, petitioner renewed his
contention that an unissued state
license is not "property" under the
mail fraud statute. On July 21,
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1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed
petitioner's conviction and sen-
tence. United States v. Bankston,
182 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 1999). The
court rejected petitioner's con-
tention concerning unissued licens-
es, deeming itself bound by United
States v. Salvatore, 110 F.3d 1131
(5th Cir.), cert denied, 522 U.S. 981
(1997), a case in which a prior Fifth
Circuit panel held that unissued
Louisiana video poker licenses con-
stitute "property" of the state under
18 U.S.C. § 1341. The Fifth Circuit's
position is supported by similar
decisions in two other circuits. The
First Circuit in United States v.
Bucuvalas, 970 F.2d 937 (1st. Cir.
1992), held that the procurement of
a liquor and entertainment license
through an alleged scheme of mail
fraud was "property" sufficient to
support a mail fraud conviction.
Similarly, in United States v.
Martinez, 905 F.2d 709 (3rd Cir.
1990), the Third Circuit concluded
that seeking a medical license
through a fraudulent scheme was
sufficient "property" to support a
mail fraud conviction.
The majority of circuit courts that
have considered the question of
whether a license constitutes "prop-
erty" under the mail fraud statute,
however, have concluded that it
does not. For example, the Second
Circuit in United States v.
Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410 (2nd Cir.
1991), held that export licenses
were not "property" for purposes of
the mail fraud statute. The Sixth
Circuit in United States v. Murphy,
836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1988), found
that bingo licenses were not "prop-
erty" for purposes of the mail fraud
statute. The Seventh Circuit in
Toubali v. United States, 875 F.2d
122 (7th Cir. 1989), refused to find
a taxi license to be "property"
under the mail fraud statute. The
Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Granberry, 908 F.2d 278 (8th Cir.
1990), found that there was no
deprivation of "property" for pur-
poses of mail fraud when the gov-
ernment alleged a falsification of an
application for a school bus opera-
tor's license. The Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Kato, 878 F.2d 267
(9th Cir. 1989), refused to find
"property" for purposes of the mail
fraud statute in a case involving
pilot licenses. And finally, the
Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.
1998), held that a state bail bond
license was not "property" for pur-
poses of the mail fraud statute.
Petitioner's request for a rehearing
before the Fifth Circuit was denied
on Sept. 2, 1999. His petition for
certiorari was filed on Nov. 9, 1999,
and granted on March 20, 2000.
Cleveland v. United States, 120
S.Ct. 1416 (March 20, 2000). The
Supreme Court has jurisdiction pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CASE ANALYSIS
Congress enacted three prohibitions
in the mail fraud statute, and each
clause of the statute proscribes a
distinct sort of "scheme or artifice."
The first clause, which prohibits
"any scheme or artifice to defraud,"
derives from the original mail fraud
statute enacted in 1872. The second
clause, which prohibits schemes
"for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promis-
es," was added in 1909. The third
clause, which prohibits schemes to
use the mails to distribute counter-
feit money, was enacted in 1889.
The statutory language has
remained unchanged since 1909.
Petitioner asserts that the primary
thrust of the second clause of the
federal mail fraud statute is to pun-
ish those who obtain "property" by
means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses through the mail. The
issuance of a license by a govern-
mental entity is argued to be a regu-
latory act and not the transfer of
government "property." Therefore,
any falsity in a license application
transacted through the mails can-
not be a violation of the mail fraud
statute.
Petitioner posits that licensing is
one of the many techniques govern-
ments use to regulate private con-
duct and raise revenue. The licens-
ing power is a basic prerogative of
government. The process of regulat-
ing occupations and businesses by
licensing provisions is an attribute
of sovereignty. Albeit in some cir-
cumstances a license may consti-
tute "property" in the hands of the
licensee, it does not follow that an
unissued license or renewed license
is "property" in the hands of the
government. From the government's
perspective, the license is a consent
to conduct business, not a piece of
"property." For example, the
Federal Circuit recently ruled that
the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") does not
lose "property" when it issues a
patent. Semiconductor Energy Lab.
Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
In Samsung, an alleged patent
infringer brought civil RICO coun-
terclaims against a patent holder,
alleging that the patent holder com-
mitted mail fraud by obtaining a
patent through "material misrepre-
sentations to the PTO using the
U.S. mail." The RICO counterclaims
were dismissed because the "PTO
has not been defrauded of proper-
ty." The court noted that although
"a patent is property," the chal-
lenged conduct did not'defraud the
government of any "property"
under either the federal mail or
wire fraud statute.
Petitioner also notes that Louisiana
law supports its legal proposition
that an unissued license is not gov-
(Continued on Page 40)
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ernment "property." The Louisiana
video poker statute expressly pro-
vides that an issued license is not
"property": "Any license issued or
renewed under the provisions of
this part is not property or a pro-
tected interest under the constitu-
tion of either the United States or
the State of Louisiana."
Petitioner further argues that absent
a clear statement by Congress, a
statute should not be construed as
significantly altering federal-state
relations. To allow mail or license
fraud charges to be brought whenev-
er a state or municipal license was
issued to someone who had alleged-
ly submitted a deceptive application
would dramatically expand the
criminal jurisdiction of the federal
government. Deception in applica-
tions for state or municipal licenses
is quintessential conduct monitored
and controlled by the states.
Petitioner believes a clear congres-
sional mandate should be required
before placing the federal govern-
ment in the business of policing
applications for state and local
licenses. Absent such a congression-
al mandate, there should be no dra-
matic expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction.
Petitioner further asserts that even
if the application of the mail fraud
statute to the issuance of govern-
ment licenses is considered ambigu-
ous, any ambiguity concerning the
scope of a criminal statute should
be resolved in favor of lenity. This
interpretative guide serves to pro-
mote fair notice to those subject to
the criminal laws, to minimize the
reach of selective or arbitrary
enforcement, and to maintain the
proper balance among Congress,
prosecutors, and courts. Currently,
there is no legislative determination
that the mail fraud statute should
extend beyond schemes to deprive
someone of money or "property"
and reach schemes that seek the
issuance of a government license.
Petitioner argues that Congress is
the proper forum for the govern-
ment to press its view that the
issuance of state and municipal
licenses should now be the subject
of mail fraud prosecutions.
Finally, petitioner notes that
Congress's most recent amendment
to the mail fraud statute does not
support an expansion of the statute
to consider an unissued license to
be government "property." In 1988,
Congress amended the mail fraud
statute by adding § 1346, which
brought any scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible
right to honest services within the
scope of the statute. Congress
did not bring within the purview
of the mail fraud statute the intangi-
ble right to administer a licensing
program.
The government, however, contends
that the second clause of the mail
fraud statute does not require that a
victim be deprived of money or
"property." Nothing in the common
understanding of the word "obtain"
either today or when the second
clause was enacted in 1909 suggests
that such a deprivation is required.
Further, the government notes that
the second clause does not contain
the words "to defraud" or any other
textual limitation requiring the
deprivation of a victim's money or
"property." Finally, the government
indicates that the dictionary defini-
tion of "obtain" supports its inter-
pretation that it does not include
the taking of some third person's
"property." Thus, the second clause
of § 1341 encompasses those cases
in which the defendant through
false or fraudulent conduct obtains
"property," regardless of whether
that "property" is in the hands of
the government.
The government asserts that the
video poker license qualifies as
"property" under § 1341. Section
1341 does not define the term
"property." However, the term
"property" has a naturally broad
and inclusive meaning that, accord-
ing to its dictionary meaning, com-
prehends anything of material value
owned or possessed. A license that
permits a person to engage in an
occupation, business, or other mon-
eymaking activity clearly qualifies
as a form of "property." A Louisiana
video poker license, once obtained
by the licensee, easily fits within the
common definition of "property." In
response to petitioner's argument
that Louisiana law expressly pro-
vides that the video poker licenses
are not "property," the government
argues that what constitutes "prop-
erty" under a federal statute is ulti-
mately a matter of federal law, not
state law.
The government also asserts that
petitioner violated the mail fraud
statute by engaging in a scheme to
deprive the state of its "property."
In other words, the licenses and
renewed licenses are "property" of
the state. The government argues
that the licenses and renewed
licenses are property of the state
because the state has a significant
financial stake in the venture and is
vested with monopolistic control
over the activity. For example, in
1999, the state of Louisiana
received $188.6 million in revenue
from video poker licenses. In addi-
tion, Louisiana has complete control
of the video poker industry-includ-
ing how the game is played, the
amount of money to play, the value
of the prizes, the specifications for
the machines, the physical number
and placement of the machines
within the establishments, and the
security requirements necessary in
the establishments-and it retains
the ability to revoke or suspend the
Issue No. 1
licenses it issues. When bundled
together, these rights and interests
constitute sufficient "property" for
purposes of the mail fraud statute.
The government also refutes peti-
tioner's assertion that the issuance
of a video poker license is simply
regulatory activity by the state of
Louisiana. The government argues
that the cases relied upon by peti-
tioner for this assertion do not
involve the state in a venture in
which the state has a significant,
financial stake. In the government's
opinion, Louisiana has much more
than a regulatory interest in the
video poker licenses. It has a signifi-
cant financial stake in its role as
issuer of the licenses.
The government believes petition-
er's argument regarding the rule of
lenity is contrary to the face of the
statute. Section 1341 reaches "any"
scheme for obtaining money or
property by false pretenses, repre-
sentations, or promises. "Any" has
an expansive meaning. Congress,
therefore, has left no doubt that
§ 1341 is broad enough to cover the
fraudulent application for a state
license in which the state has a sig-
nificant financial interest.
Finally, the government argues that
Congress's 1988 enactment of 18
U.S.C. § 1346 (regarding the depriv-
ing of another of the intangible right
to honest services) has no bearing
on petitioner's case. The govern-
ment notes that this case involves
the interpretation of § 1341, not
§ 1346.
SIGNIFICANCE
Businesses apply for hundreds of
thousands of local, state, and federal
licenses every year. These standard
business licenses pertain to many
and varied matters. Approximately
600 occupations and professions are
regulated by one or more states
through licenses. It is estimated that
as much as one-third of the work-
force is directly affected by licens-
ing laws. Occupational licensing,
however, is only one form of licens-
ing. Countless other activities,
including driving a car, hunting,
fishing, and building a home,
require one or more licenses, per-
mits, or other forms of governmen-
tal approval. In all likelihood, tens
of thousands of licenses and permit
applications are submitted every
day in this country.
In the vast majority of cases, the
submission, evaluation, or issuance
of the license involves the U.S. mail.
In addition, some part of the licens-
ing process will likely involve one or
more telephone or fax communica-
tions. In either event, the applica-
tion process could become the sub-
ject of federal felony charges under
the mail and wire fraud statutes
based on an alleged deception.
The federal mail fraud statute pro-
hibits schemes for obtaining "prop-
erty" by means of false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or
promises. Is a state or municipal
government's issuance of a license
"property" under the mail fraud
statute? If so, many thousands of
license applicants could become
subject to federal felony charges
under the mail fraud statute.
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